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DE RUEHRH #0362/01 0640804
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 040804Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7872
INFO RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 2378
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9427

S E C R E T RIYADH 000362

SIPDIS

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DHAHRAN SENDS
DEPT FOR P, M, CA, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/OPO, S/CT, NEA/EX, NEA/ARP, SES-O, DS
COMMAND CENTER, INR

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [CASC](#) [AMGT](#) [SA](#)
SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 26 FEB 2008

REF: A. RIYADH 286
[1](#)B. RIYADH 2
[1](#)C. IIR 1 656 7280 08
[1](#)D. DS DAILY FEB 26 (PAGE 7)

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon, reasons 1.4 (c) and (g)

[1](#)1. (SBU) On 26 February 2008, Consulate General Dhahran convened an full Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting to discuss the ramifications of REFTEL A on ConGen Dhahran operations and the current threat environment in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. In attendance were the CG, RSO, FCS, ITC, POL, RAO, CONS, and PD. The core EAC reconvened on 2 March 2008 to review the threat information in REFTEL C.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) RSO commenced the meeting by noting that although the overall threat condition for Saudi Arabia had been dropped from Charlie Plus to Charlie (REFTEL A), that there were still regular reporting streams concerning threats in the Eastern Province. The RSO discussed the current security posture for the consulate, and the EAC agreed that no changes were warranted concerning the physical security of the consulate compound. RSO also noted that a request had been made for a Surveillance Detection team (REFTEL B), and that funding appeared imminent. RSO also noted that several motorpool vehicles had been switched to non-diplomatic white license plates and that a more rigorous program of enforcing time and route variation had been implemented.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) The EAC discussed the possibility of modifying the vehicle policy for ConGen Dhahran, with a specific emphasis on adjusting the aspects of the policy regarding use of armored vehicles. The current policy requires the use of armored vehicles for all travel within the Eastern Province with three exceptions. Those exceptions are overland travel to Riyadh on a case-by-case basis approved by RSOs Dhahran and Riyadh, overland travel to Bahrain via the King Fahd causeway, and travel to the Saudi Aramco Main Camp, located one mile away.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed the current restrictions and proposed revising them to also allow travel in unarmored vehicles between secure residential compounds and the consulate compound. The EAC noted that the use of vehicles could potentially increase the security posture for individuals, since they would allow for more varied routes and times. It would also decrease the amount of shuttle traffic in Chevy Suburbans, which the EAC felt could also decrease the consulate's visibility and increase security. The EAC remarked that the farthest residence occupied by a consulate direct-hire American was only five miles away (the

other two compounds are three and four miles away respectively.)

¶5. (S/NF) The EAC agreed that for a direct-hire American to drive off-compound that they would need to follow the strictest personal safety and security rules. The drivers must have a valid Saudi driver's license, they must have completed the DSTC-offered OT-610 Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course (or DS-approved equivalent), they must strictly vary their routes and times, and they must drive vehicles with non-diplomatic white plates. The EAC agreed that vehicles, armored or unarmored, should not be left unattended at non-secure locations. In addition, the EAC requested that RSO and MGT provide an informational card for drivers to use in the event of an accident.

¶6. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that the current threat condition for Post of Charlie was appropriate and that the proposed changes would allow for greater flexibility and increased security for individuals living off-compound. While these are currently proposed changes, RSO will continue to evaluate the feasibility of implementing said changes in the Eastern Province, work with MGT to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to support the changes, and brief the full EAC at the next regularly scheduled EAC meeting, at which time the full EAC may consider implementing the proposals with concurrence from Riyadh.

¶7. (S/NF) The core EAC reconvened on 2 March 2008 to review the threat information in REFTEL C. The EAC agreed with DS/IP/ITA's assessment in REFTEL D and determined that Post's security profile stance was appropriate for the information available.

¶8. (SBU) ConGen Dhahran will continue to closely monitor all threat information available, and Post's security posture will be modified accordingly as circumstances dictated.

(Approved:KINCANNON)
FRAKER